Publications
Russia and the Dilemmas of Nuclear Disarmament
June 1, 2012
IMEMO
Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev
Reports/Studies
This new publication from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) examines the prospects for transforming nuclear deterrence and presents solutions and action proposals aimed at arms limitation and non-proliferation.
NATO Defence and Deterrence Posture: Central and Eastern European Perspectives
May 15, 2012
Polish Institute of International Affairs
Reports/Studies
PISM analyst Jacek Durkalec discusses the approach of Central and Eastern Europeans to NATO defense and deterrence capabilities.
Disarming Doubt: the future of extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia
April 19, 2012
The Lowy Institute
Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham
Reports/Studies
The Lowy Institute and Japan Institute of International Affairs, partners of the Nuclear Security Project, released a new report entitled, Disarming Doubt: The Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia. Supported by NTI, Disarming Doubt was produced by the Lowy Institute in partnership with the Japan Institute of International Affairs and provides a window into the debate about security, disarmament and extended deterrence in East Asia.
Interconnection between Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Reality or Myth?
December 1, 2011
IMEMO
Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev
Reports/Studies
Despite the unique character of the NPT in terms of the list of parties it includes, in the first decade of the 21st century the prospects for non-proliferation have caused increasing concerns of the global community and policy-makers in most of the world’s countries. The next stage in proliferation, provided that it gains momentum, will not only cause exponential growth of the nuclear threat, it will make, as a result of the synergy of many factors, the use of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future virtually inevitable. Progress towards further arms reductions and limitations may perceivably improve the situation and provide conditions and incentives for strengthening non-proliferation regime. The aim of shutting down proliferation channels may be attained through raising the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards, improving export controls, strict formalization of the procedure of withdrawal from the Treaty and increasing its political significance, bringing into force and the conclusion of a number of multilateral treaties designed to serve as 'barriers' to violations of the Treaty and the withdrawal from it.
