(Prospects for New Security Architecture, Nuclear Relations, CFE Treaty)
March 18, 2010
Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, Sergey Oznobishchev, Alexander Pikaev
Despite the frequently declared focus on partnership, the NATO Russia relations have not yet reached a conflict-free and constructive level. Within the past two decades, the actual sharpness of the differences and discrepancies between the parties has not decreased; in fact, at times it has risen quite drastically. Despite the fact that none of successive Russia's presidents has ruled out the possibility of Russia's accession to NATO, the West invariably disregarded these messages. Although there is quite a number of institutions and decisions to promote European security, the task of its enhancement certainly remains relevant. It is obvious that some elements of the existing European order are extremely fragile and inefficient
NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma
March 1, 2010
Royal United Services Institute
Malcolm Chalmers, Simon Lunn
The purpose of this RUSI occasional paper is to contribute to the emerging debate on the future of the small number of remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. During the Cold War, these weapons played a central role in NATO plans for deterring a Soviet attack on NATO. As late as 1991, the US maintained around 2,500 such warheads in Europe, operationally deployed with short-range artillery and missiles, surface ships and dual-capable aircraft. The clear message was that, if it came to war with the Soviet Union, early nuclear use by NATO was a distinct possibility. Since the Cold War ended, however, the role of these weapons in NATO strategy has been dramatically reduced, as have their numbers.
Toward a Nuclear Weapons Free World: A Chinese Perspective
November 1, 2009
There is pressure and expectation on China from some quarters to be more transparent about its nuclear arsenal and to engage in a nuclear disarmament process. Given, however, the recent official statements on Chinese nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policy, including in response to President Obama’s proposal, see: Statement by President Hu Jintao at the United Nations Security Council Summit on Nuclear NonProliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, very small size of the Chinese arsenal alongside those of the United States and Russia, and given that China already has a policy of deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in its national security, it would be reasonable to expect Beijing to participate in nuclear disarmament only if Washington and Moscow have reached much lower force levels. In the meantime, however, China can contribute as a responsible stakeholder, including in addressing proliferation cases on its periphery and in other regions of concern.
Unconventional Partners: Australia-India Cooperation in Reducing Nuclear Danger
October 1, 2009
Rory Medcalf, Amandeep Gill
To reduce the grave dangers posed by the continued existence and spread of nuclear weapons, and the risk that they will one day again be used, unconventional diplomacy is needed. Part of the problem is the way in which global agreements or pragmatic interim solutions are often obstructed by longstanding divisions among nations: nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states; Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) members and nonmembers; Western states and the non-aligned. New partnerships and platforms for dialogue could cut across these stale categories, at least on some issues, and expand the space for agreement and new thinking. Australia and India could take the lead in crafting one such new partnership.
Wicked Weapons: North Asia’s Nuclear Tangle
September 1, 2009
Media attention concentrates on North Korea's threatening nuclear behaviour, and the frustrating quest for disarmament on the Korean Peninsula exposes some of the strategic tensions in the wider region. But uncertainties also surround the nuclear future of China and, in its own way, Japan. The positive steps happening globally on nuclear arms control, led by the United States, need to be handled with great care lest they create new dangers in North Asia. The strategic and nuclear challenges in this region, so critical to world security and prosperity in the 21st century, present a 'wicked problem': one that is complex and close to intractable, because fixing one aspect typically worsens or creates others.